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Abstract
This note shows that introducing into the economy a few number of agents who do not
support sunspots theories magnifies endogenous business cycles fluctuations when the
current state of the economic system is sensitive enough to traders' forecasts, or equivalently,
in presence of indeterminacy.
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The sunspot literature usually assumes that all the agents have the same
rational belief. Some have argued that introducing agents who do not support
sunspot theories should stabilize such endogenous competitive business cycles.
For instance, in a misperceived cycle, prices evolve according to a determin-
istic cycle, though some agents expect the price to cycle and others wrongly
expect the price to be drawn randomly in each period; see Azariadis and Gues-
nerie (1982), Evans, Honkapohja and Sargent (1993) or Woordford (1990). The
presence of non-sunspots believers is stabilizing in the sense that misperceived
cycles do not exist when the proportion of these agents is large enough. As this
note highlights, however, in the remaining polar case where this proportion is
suﬃciently low, price ﬂuctuations will be magniﬁed as soon as the economy is
sensitive to traders’ forecasts. In other words, a small departure from rationality
may magnify ﬂuctuations.
2. General Framework
I shall use a simple version of the overlapping generations model that involves
one non storable normal consumption good and ﬁat money, whose stock ¯ m ≡ 1
is ﬁxed. At each date t (t ≥ 0), there is a size 1 continuum of newborns who
live for two consecutive periods. In the ﬁrst, they work during nt units of
time, which allows them to produce yt = nt units of goods. Each unit is then
sold at price pt and the collected ﬁat money is used to transfer wealth from
one period to the next, t + 1, where they enjoy consuming ct+1 units of goods.
Preferences of a newborn at date t are represented by a separable utility function
Et [u(ct+1)]−v (nt), where u(·) is increasing and concave, and v(·) is increasing
and convex.
The operator Et(·) depends on traders’ beliefs. Let us distinguish two types
of agents.
First there are α (0 ≤ α ≤ 1) informed agents. Young agents of this type
observe a sunspot signal which alternates between two states l and h, i.e. period
(t+1) state is st+1 = l (resp. h) when period t state is st = h (resp. l). All these
agents a priori believe that price should be perfectly correlated with sunspot
signals: they expect the period (t+1) price to be pe
h (resp. pe
l) if st = l (resp. h).
If st = l, they consequently face the intertemporal budget constraint pe
hct+1 ≤
ptnt, and their optimal current labor supply is some function ni (pt/pe
h). By the
same way, if st = h, their labor supply is ni (pt/pe
l).
The (1 − α) remaining agents are uninformed of the true law of the signal.
They actually use the sample moments of the signal in order to form their
1forecasts, i.e. they expect the period (t + 1) price to be pe
l with probability
1/2 and pe
h with probability 1/2, whatever st is. Let nu (pt/pe
l,pt/pe
h) be their
optimal labor supply in the current period.
Since the aggregate demand for consumption goods is equal to real holdings
of old agents at date t, ¯ m/pt ≡ 1/pt, the current market clearing price, if st = s




















for s0 = l,h and s0 6= s. This allows us to deﬁne a misperceived two-period
cycle as a triplet ((pl,ph),α) such that pt = pl (resp. ph) in (1) if st = l (resp.
st = h), pe
l = pl and pe





























In a misperceived equilibrium, the informed agents’ belief ﬁts the actual law
of the economy, whereas the one of uninformed agents is merely statistically
correct, except in the special case where pl = ph. If α = 1 in (2) and (3), then a
misperceived two-period cycle coincides the usual concept of two-period cycle,
which is known to exist (in the so-called Samuelson case) whenever the elasticity
εi(·) of labor supply ni(·) with respect to expected real wage is less than (−1/2)
at point pl = ph (see, e.g. Azariadis and Guesnerie 1986). Under this condition,
and provided that α is close enough to 1, a misperceived equilibrium also exists.
3. Destabilizing Eﬀects of Belief Heterogeneity
The purpose of this section is to describe how equilibrium prices (pl,ph) react
to a raise in the proportion of uninformed traders, when most of the agents are
informed in the economy, i.e. when α is close enough to 1.
Proposition 1. Consider a two-period misperceived cycle ((pl,ph),α), with
pl < ph by deﬁnition. Assume that εi(pl/ph) < 0. Then, there exists a threshold
proportion ¯ α < 1 such that, for any α ≥ ¯ α, both dph/dα < 0 and dpl/dα > 0
if 1 + εi(pl/ph) + εi(ph/pl) < 0, i.e. the usual two-period cycle ((pl,ph),1) is
locally indeterminate. If, on the contrary, 1+εi(pl/ph)+εi(ph/pl) > 0, i.e. the
usual two-period cycle ((pl,ph),1) is locally determinate, then both dph/dα > 0
and dpl/dα < 0 for any α ≥ ¯ α.
2Proof. Let us diﬀerentiate (2) and (3) with respect to pl, ph, and α. At












































































and ∆ = (1 + εi(pl/ph) + εi(ph/pl))/(phpl) (∆ is assumed to diﬀer from 0).
Observe now that both convexity properties of individual preferences and the
fact that the ﬁrst-order condition of the problem solved by an uninformed agent
is a weighted average of the ﬁrst-order conditions of the problems solved by


































whatever pt is. Let respectively pt = pl and pt = ph in the preceding relation.
Then we have both nu (1,pl/ph) < ni (pl/ph) and ni (ph/pl) < nu (ph/pl,1).
Finally εi(·) < 0 by hypothesis, and εi(·) > −1 when leisure is normal. Thus
∆dpl/dα < 0 and ∆dph/dα > 0. But ∆ < 0 if and only if the two-period cycle
is locally indeterminate, which shows the result. 
The property of indeterminacy plays a crucial role: in presence of indetermi-
nacy, introducing a small number of uninformed agents raises the highest price
of the cycle and reduces the lowest one.
Actually, their presence aﬀects excess demand through two distinct channels,
to be called the size and the expectations eﬀects. The size eﬀect corresponds
to the change in the current price pt in (1) that results from a lower α, with pe
l
and pe
h ﬁxed to their initial level. In order to restore equilibrium, where price
forecasts are correct, adjustments in expected prices are consequently needed.
These changes in forecasts induce a new change in the current price, and thus
triggers a feedback process from current to expected prices that continues until
price beliefs are self-fulﬁlling; this is the expectations eﬀect.
The size eﬀect is actually always stabilizing. In the indeterminate conﬁgu-
ration, the expectations eﬀect opposes to the size eﬀect, and is responsible for
magnifying price ﬂuctuations.
The reason why the size eﬀect is stabilizing stems from the inertia in the be-
havior of uninformed agents; their behavior less volatile than the one of informed
3agents since it can not rely on sunspots. In fact, when the current price is low,
so that the aggregate supply is large, the quantity produced by an uninformed
agent is less than the one produced by an informed agent, as (4) highlights.
Therefore, at a low current price, reducing the proportion of informed agents
involves an increase in the excess demand, and so, in order to clear the market,
there must be a raise in the current price. On the contrary, a decrease in the
current price would be required for high current prices. To summarize: the
price, through the size eﬀect, tends to raise when it is low, and to fall when it
is high.
The assumption εi(pl/ph) < 0 now implies that, for α close enough to 1 in
(1), if the signal is l (resp. h), the current price decreases (resp. increases)
whenever the highest expected price pe
h increases and the smallest one pe
l de-
creases.1 Thus, for price forecasts to be correct when agents expect ﬂuctuations
to be magniﬁed, and given that the size eﬀect has always a stabilizing eﬀect,
there must be a destabilizing change in the current price due to changes in
traders’ forecasts. This eﬀect overcomes the stabilizing size eﬀect in the inde-
terminate conﬁguration, where changes in current price are ampliﬁed by changes
in expected prices (that is, |dpt| > |dpe
l| in state l, and |dpt| > |dpe
h| in state h).
1To see this point most clearly, assume for instance that the current state of the signal is
l. An increase in the expected price pe
h leads to a decrease in the expected real wage, and
so, under assumption (H), to an increase in informed agents’ output. For the market for
consumption goods to clear, a decrease in the current temporary equilibrium price is required,
which is destabilizing in state l.
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